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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Lawrence Brooks filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255, seeking 
reinstatement of his right to appeal his conviction on the 
ground that the District Court failed to inform him of his 
appellate rights in violation of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. After a full hearing on the merits, the District 
Court denied Brooks' petition, and Brooks has appealed. 
We will deny Brooks' request for a certificate of 
appealability and dismiss his petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, filed with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2241. 
 
I. 
 
In 1993, Lawrence Brooks pleaded guilty to participation 
in a drug conspiracy and received a sentence of 24 years 
and 4 months of imprisonment. According to former Rule 
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32(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 1 the 
District Court was required, after imposing sentence, to 
advise the defendant of his right to appeal. The District 
Court failed to so advise Brooks, and no direct appeal was 
filed. In 1997, Brooks filed a motion for post-conviction 
relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2255, seeking, inter alia, 
reinstatement of his right to a direct appeal. 
 
Brooks filed his motion for post-conviction relief pro se. 
In his motion, Brooks raised 11 separate grounds for relief, 
and ultimately the District Court appointed the Federal 
Public Defender to represent Brooks. His attorney then filed 
an amended motion for post-conviction relief, which 
clarified the "loss of appellate rights" claim. 
 
On April 28, 1998, an evidentiary hearing was held 
before the District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. At that hearing, Brooks himself testified, as 
did his appointed trial counsel, Jeffrey Yoffee. Brooks 
testified that the Court failed to advise him of his right to 
appeal, and that fact is undisputed. He further testified 
that his attorney had not advised him of the right to file an 
appeal, either at the courthouse following sentencing or at 
any time during the ten-day period following the sentencing 
hearing. Finally, Brooks testified that, if he had known of 
his right to appeal, he would have instructed counsel to file 
one. 
 
Yoffee testified that he had no specific recollection of 
advising Brooks of his appellate rights, either on the day of 
sentencing or in the ten days following. Yoffee confirmed 
that he did not have any notes or memoranda reflecting 
that he had advised Brooks of his appellate rights. What 
Yoffee did say, and it is this fact on which the District 
Court seized, is that it was his customary practice, 
following a sentencing hearing, to inform clients of their 
right to appeal. Specifically, Yoffee said: 
 
       It is [my customary practice to inform defendants of 
       their appellate rights after the sentencing hearing] and 
       I believe I had a conversation with Mr. Brooks after 
       sentencing up in the holding cell regarding his 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Rule is now in subsection (c)(5) of Rule 32. 
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       appellate rights, but to be honest with you, I can't be 
       sure if I'm filling in the blanks or whether my 
       recollection of it is actually a true one. All I can say is 
       I routinely in federal cases especially go to the holding 
       cell after a sentence and speak with my client not just 
       about appellate rights but that's generally the end of 
       the case. I say if you have any questions, give me a 
       call, that kind of thing. I'm almost certain that I did 
       with Mr. Brooks, but I can't positively remember that 
       I did. 
 
App. 82-83 (direct testimony). He further testified that, if a 
defendant requests an appeal, he files that appeal, 
regardless of the grounds. 
 
On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Yoffee 
confirmed that he "strongly believed" that he had advised 
Brooks of his appellate rights. See App. 106-07. He agreed 
with the prosecutor that he "most likely" would have done 
so immediately after sentencing. In this regard, Yoffee noted 
that he had billed the court for a three-tenths of one hour 
meeting with Brooks on the date of sentencing. 
Nevertheless, there are no notations in his files regarding 
conversations with Brooks during the ten-day window in 
which to file a notice of appeal. Brooks asserts that this 
omission is significant, "because on a later occasion, Mr. 
Yoffee did make a note of a communication from Mr. 
Brooks regarding his desire for an appeal."2 Brief for 
Appellant at 14. 
 
After hearing all of the evidence, the District Court denied 
Brooks' motion for post-conviction relief. The Court found 
that it had failed to advise Brooks of his right to an appeal 
and further found that Yoffee had "no independent 
recollection of advising the defendant of his right to appeal 
. . . ." App. 165. Nevertheless, the Court was persuaded 
that Yoffee had advised Brooks of his appellate rights and, 
thus, that the Court's failure to do so constituted harmless 
error. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The note was made in January, 1994, some four months after the 
sentencing hearing. At that time, Brooks called or wrote Yoffee to express 
his desire to appeal his sentence. 
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Brooks appealed to this Court, seeking a certificate of 
appealability to review the District Court's judgment. In the 
alternative, Brooks has filed an original petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus with this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241, arguing that, if we deny his request for a certificate 
of appealability, we nevertheless exercise our power under 
S 2241 to review his claims. 
 
II. 
 
The first issue -- i.e., whether we will grant Brooks' 
request for a certificate of appealability -- need not detain 
us long. Section 2253(c)(1) of Title 28 provides that "an 
appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from. . . 
the final order in a proceeding under section 2255. . . 
[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 
appealability . . . ." 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(1)(B). Section 
2253(c)(2) then goes on to provide that "[a] certificate of 
appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made 
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 
Id. S 2253(c)(2) (emphasis added). Brooks has argued that, 
while S 2253(c)(2) seemingly permits us to review only 
constitutional questions, we should, nevertheless, hold that 
certificates of appealability may be awarded in cases 
presenting substantial federal, but non-constitutional, 
questions. A panel of this Court heard argument on that 
issue on February 28, 2000, and then, a majority of the 
active judges having voted for rehearing, the issue was 
reargued before the Court en banc on May 24, 2000. 
 
This case was reargued en banc along with United States 
v. Cepero, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL ____ (3d Cir. 2000), which 
presented the same issue. Following the en banc  Court's 
decision in Cepero, this case was remanded to the original 
merits panel for final disposition. As we held in Cepero, we 
may not grant a certificate of appealability to review non- 
constitutional questions unless the issue is procedural and 
the underlying petition raises a substantial constitutional 
question. Accord Slack v. McDaniel, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 120 S. 
Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000) ("When the district court denies a 
habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching 
the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a[certificate 
of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at 
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least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether 
the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a 
constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 
debatable whether the district court was correct in its 
procedural ruling.") (emphasis added). It is conceded here 
that Brooks' only claim, which is based on Rule 32 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, is not a constitutional 
claim. Accordingly, we are constrained to deny Brooks' 
request for a certificate of appealability, and the District 
Court's judgment will, thus, stand. 
 
III. 
 
Apparently recognizing the difficulty in overcoming the 
language of 28 U.S.C. S 2253(c)(2), Brooks hasfiled an 
original petition for a writ of habeas corpus with this Court, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2241. He asks that, if we hold, as 
we have, that we are unable to review the District Court's 
judgment in the S 2255 proceeding, we, nevertheless, 
exercise our power under S 2241 to adjudicate his 
application for a writ of habeas corpus as an original matter.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Section 2241(a) provides that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted 
by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any 
circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." The courts of 
appeals 
are conspicuously absent from that enumeration, and the circuit courts 
have uniformly disclaimed power, as courts, to issue an original writ of 
habeas corpus. See Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(en banc) (panel does not have jurisdiction to entertain an original 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus); Noriega-Sandoval v. INS, 911 F.2d 
258, 261 (9th Cir. 1990) (We . . . lack jurisdiction as a court to 
consider 
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as an original matter."); Ojeda 
Rios 
v. Wigen, 863 F.2d 196, 200 (2d Cir. 1988) (Chambers of Judge 
Newman) (courts of appeals have no power to issue an original writ of 
habeas corpus); Zimmerman v. Spears, 656 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(same); Parker v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir. 1969); Loum v. 
Alvis, 
263 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1959); Posey v. Dowd, 134 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 
1943); see also United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 681 (3d 
Cir. 1954) (an appeal from a final order of a circuit judge entered after 
full hearing on a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. S 2241). 
There is a minor exception: a court of appeals has the power, under the 
"all writs" act, to issue a writ of habeas corpus "where it may be 
necessary for the exercise of a jurisdiction already existing." Whitney v. 
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As we will explain, we hold that S 2241 is not available as 
a remedy for Brooks. 
 
Section 2255 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
       An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of 
       a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by 
       motion pursuant to this section, shall not be 
       entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to 
       apply for relief, by motion, to the court which 
       sentenced him, or that such court has denied him 
       relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion 
       is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
       detention. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2255, P 5 (emphasis added). Thus, in a 
situation where the S 2255 procedure is shown to be 
"inadequate or ineffective," a prisoner is entitled to apply for 
a writ of habeas corpus, and courts are empowered to grant 
the writ by 28 U.S.C. S 2241. See United States v. Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205, 223 (1952). 
 
We recently considered the scope of the "inadequate or 
ineffective" "safety valve" in S 2255 in In re Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). In Dorsainvil, the petitioner argued 
that the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United 
States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which was decided after 
Dorsainvil's first S 2255 petition was denied on the merits, 
rendered his weapons conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)(1) invalid. He wished to collaterally attack that 
conviction in the District Court and asked this Court to 
certify his second habeas petition under S 2255's 
gatekeeping provisions limiting a prisoner's ability to file a 
successive habeas petition. The Court first held that the 
petition had failed to satisfy those gatekeeping provisions 
because his Bailey claim was a statutory claim. As a result, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1906). However, in this case, because we 
have no appellate jurisdiction, that exception, which usually applies 
when a court of appeals is fashioning a remedy, is inapplicable. 
Accordingly, as a panel, we are without jurisdiction to issue Brooks a 
writ of habeas corpus. We raise the issue only for the purposes of 
clarification, however, because as we will explain, we ultimately hold 
S 2241 does not afford Brooks a remedy. 
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petitioner was unable to bring his new claim in aS 2255 
proceeding in the District Court. 
 
The Court did not stop there, however. Dorsainvil argued 
that if his Bailey claim could not be heard in the District 
Court, then S 2255, as amended by the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), was unconstitutional. The 
Court avoided reaching the "thorny constitutional issue[s]" 
by holding that "under narrow circumstances, a petitioner 
in Dorsainvil's uncommon situation may resort to the writ 
of habeas corpus as codified under 28 U.S.C. S 2241." 
Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 248. The Court first recognized that 
"the AEDPA did not amend the `safety valve' clause in 
S 2255 that refers to the power of the federal courts to grant 
writs of habeas corpus pursuant to S 2241" where S 2255 is 
"inadequate or ineffective." Id. at 249. The Court then held: 
 
       Dorsainvil does not have and, because of the 
       circumstances that he was convicted for a violation of 
       S 924(c)(1) before the Bailey decision, never had an 
       opportunity to challenge his conviction as inconsistent 
       with the Supreme Court's interpretation of S 924(c)(1). 
       If, as the Supreme Court stated in [Davis v. United 
       States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974)], it is a "complete 
       miscarriage of justice" to punish a defendant for an act 
       that the law does not make criminal, thereby 
       warranting resort to the collateral remedy afforded by 
       S 2255, it must follow that it is the same"complete 
       miscarriage of justice" when the AEDPA amendment to 
       S 2255 makes that collateral remedy unavailable. In 
       that unusual circumstance, the remedy afforded by 
       S 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective" to test the legality 
       of [Dorsainvil's] detention. 
 
Id. at 251. 
 
The Court then cautioned: 
 
       We do not suggest that S 2255 would be "inadequate or 
       ineffective" so as to enable a second petitioner to 
       invoke S 2241 merely because that petitioner is unable 
       to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of the 
       amended S 2255. Such a holding would effectively 
       eviscerate Congress's intent in amending S 2255. 
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       However, allowing someone in Dorsainvil's unusual 
       position -- that of a prisoner who had no earlier 
       opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that 
       an intervening change in substantive law may negate, 
       even when the government concedes that such a 
       change should be applied retroactively -- is hardly 
       likely to undermine the gatekeeping provisions of 
       S 2255. 
 
Id. at 251. 
 
Several of our sister circuits have likewise concluded that 
S 2241 can, at times, provide an avenue for relief where 
none would otherwise be available. See Charles v. Chandler, 
180 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 1999); Wofford v. Scott , 177 F.3d 
1236 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Barrett , 178 F.3d 34 
(1st Cir. 1999); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 
1998); Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 
1997). Indeed, a common theme is evident in the circuit 
court opinions addressing the availability of S 2241: in 
those cases in which recourse to S 2241 is granted, the 
petitioner would have no other means of having his or her 
claim heard. See Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251 (authorizing 
relief under S 2241 for "a prisoner who had no earlier 
opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an 
intervening change in substantive law may negate") 
(emphasis added); see also Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1244 
(prisoner may avail himself or herself of S 2241 if "the 
prisoner had no reasonable opportunity for a judicial 
remedy of [a] fundamental defect before filing the S 2241 
proceeding"); Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611 ("A federal 
prisoner should be permitted to seek habeas corpus only if 
he had no reasonable opportunity to obtain an earlier 
judicial correction of a fundamental defect in his conviction 
or sentence because the law changed after his first 2255 
motion."); Triestman, 124 F.3d at 377 (the "inadequate or 
ineffective" safety valve in S 2255 is available only in "the 
set of cases in which the petitioner cannot, for whatever 
reason, utilize S 2255, and in which the failure to allow for 
collateral review would raise serious constitutional 
questions"). 
 
In this case, Brooks received a full evidentiary hearing on 
the merits of the very claim for which he seeks relief under 
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S 2241. It has long been the rule in this circuit that "the 
remedy by motion [under S 2255] can be`inadequate or 
ineffective to test the legality of . . . detention' only if it can 
be shown that some limitation of scope or procedure would 
prevent a Section 2255 proceeding from affording the 
prisoner a full hearing and adjudication of his claim of 
wrongful detention." United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 
212 F.2d 681, 684 (3d Cir. 1954). Indeed, Brooks does not 
argue that his hearing before the District Court was in any 
way defective or not meaningful. Nor does he contend that 
the District Court was without authority to grant the full 
relief he sought. Rather, his only argument as to why his 
S 2255 remedies were "inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of his detention" relates to his inability to appeal 
the District Court's decision. 
 
The fundamental problem with Brooks' argument is that 
it was Congress' express decision (as seen in the language 
of S 2253(c)(2)) to deny Brooks a right to appeal, and as we 
explained in Cepero, that decision was a valid exercise of 
Congress' power. Therefore, if we were to hold that Brooks 
can effectively seek review of the District Court's decision in 
this Court pursuant to our power under S 2241, we would 
be eviscerating Congress' intent in amending S 2253. That 
is something we are unwilling to do. See Dorsainvil, 119 
F.3d at 251 ("We do not suggest that S 2255 would be 
`inadequate or ineffective' so as to enable a second 
petitioner to invoke S 2241 merely because that petitioner is 
unable to meet the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 
the amended S 2255. Such a holding would effectively 
eviscerate Congress's intent in amending S 2255."); see also 
Barrett, 178 F.3d at 50 ("A petition underS 2255 cannot 
become `inadequate or ineffective,' thus permitting the use 
of S 2241, merely because a petitioner cannot meet the 
AEDPA `second or successive' requirements. Such a result 
would make Congress's AEDPA amendment of S 2255 a 
meaningless gesture."); Davenport, 147 F.3d at 608 
("Congress did not change [the `inadequate or ineffective'] 
language when in the Antiterrorism Act it imposed 
limitations on the filing of successive 2255 motions. The 
retention of the old language opens the way to the 
argument that when the new limitations prevent the 
prisoner from obtaining relief under 2255, his remedy 
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under that section is inadequate and he may turn to 2241. 
That can't be right; it would nullify the limitations."); 
Triestman, 124 F.3d at 376 ("If it were the case that any 
prisoner who is prevented from bringing a S 2255 petition 
could, without more, establish that S 2255 is`inadequate or 
ineffective,' . . . then Congress would have accomplished 
nothing at all in its attempts -- through statutes like the 
AEDPA -- to place limits on federal collateral review."); In re 
Vial, 115 F.3d 1192, 1194 n.5 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 
(stating that S 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective simply 
"because an individual is procedurally barred from filing a 
S 2255 motion"). 
 
In conclusion, because Brooks did have a meaningful 
opportunity to present his claim to the District Court, his 
S 2255 remedy cannot be said to be either inadequate or 
ineffective. If we were to hold that the unavailability of an 
appeal under S 2253(c)(2) rendered Brooks'S 2255 remedies 
inadequate or ineffective, we would be undermining a valid 
act of Congress. Accordingly, we will deny Brooks'S 2241 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons stated herein, we will deny Brooks' 
request for a certificate of appealability and also will 
dismiss his original petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
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